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INTRODUCTION 
In New York City, owners violated zoning regulations and opened 
up their basements, garages, and other floors to rent to people 
(particularly low-income immigrants) priced out of the formal 
market.1  The more than 100,000 illegal dwelling units in New York 
City (NYC) were referred to as “granny units,” “illegal twos or 
threes,” or “accessory units.”2  Due to the safety and habitability 
considerations of “alter[ing] or modif[ying] of an existing building to 
create an additional housing unit without first obtaining approval 
from the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB),” the City 
government devoted substantial resources to detecting and stopping 
such illegal conversion.3  Recently, however, Mayor Bill de Blasio 
proposed to legalize such illegal dwelling units to increase the City’s 
rent-regulated housing stock.4  The question remains as to whether 
crackdown or legalization is the right policy. 
Such illegal housing is not unique to NYC.  Shenzhen, a city in 
south China that experienced a population explosion from 300,000 to 
over 10 million within three decades, faces the same problem as NYC: 
legal housing supply cannot catch up with the population growth, 
resulting in prevalent illegal housing supply. 5   Almost half of 
Shenzhen’s buildings have been built illegally and now host over eight 
million migrant workers and low-income residents.6  In the past three 
decades, the Shenzhen city government has swung between 
legalization and crackdown of such illegal buildings, neither of which 
has resolved the problem.7  Due to the large number of illegal 
apartments, the “crackdown” option has proven to be impossible, 
while legalization has incurred huge information costs and 
encouraged more illegal constructions.  In more recent years, though, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. CHHAYA CMT. DEV. CORP., ILLEGAL DWELLING UNITS: A POTENTIAL SOURCE 
OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (Aug. 14, 2008), 
http://chhayacdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Illegal-Dwelling-Units-A-Potential-
Source-of-Affordable-Housing-in-New-York-City.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8G3-
NB7U] [hereinafter CHHAYA CDC]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Illegal Conversions, N.Y.C. BUILDINGS, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/
renter/illegal-conversions-vacates.page [https://perma.cc/8K2Q-8X7W] (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2017). 
 4. Mireya Navarro, Looser Rules on Illegal Housing Sought, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/nyregion/looser-rules-on-illegal-
housing-sought.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3U74-954B]. 
 5. Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 197, 207–08 (2015). 
 6. Id. at 201. 
 7. See infra Section II.C. 
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the Shenzhen city government has discovered an effective policy: 
keeping the city government’s zoning power intact while granting an 
option to owners of illegal housing to buy an exemption.8  The lesson 
from Shenzhen is that options matter at least as much as the 
allocation of initial entitlements.  In the case of prevalent zoning 
violations, these options should be granted to parties that have the 
best information to make decisions—the numerous individual owners 
rather than the government.  I propose that this optional zoning 
approach should be taken in dealing with illegal housing in New York 
City. 
Part I of this article details illegal housing in New York City, 
including the three main challenges, namely, information costs, 
externality, and heterogeneity in dealing with illegal housing.  Part II 
discusses how Shenzhen dealt with illegal buildings with the same 
challenges.  Part III concludes with a preliminary proposal of 
community-based zoning options for New York City.   
I.  ILLEGAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK 
Overcrowding and undersupply of affordable housing have led to a 
surge in illegal apartments throughout NYC.9  The typical migrant 
worker in Chinatown, Manhattan or Flushing, Queens is likely to live 
in an illegal location under the current NYC zoning law.10  In Jackson 
Heights, Queens, or similar neighborhoods, houses originally 
designed for a nuclear family are being occupied by multiple 
extended families, including cousins, aunts, and uncles.11  Resorting to 
illegal housing is a problem not limited to immigrants.  Even in the 
Upper East Side of Manhattan, real estate brokers occasionally show 
young professionals suspiciously low priced units which turned out to 
be basements without independent mailboxes.12  The Pratt Center for 
Community Development (Pratt Center) and Chhaya Community 
Development Corporation (Chhaya CDC) estimated that between 
300,000 and 500,000 New Yorkers live in housing units that do not 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. See infra Section II.C.3.  For a more comprehensive picture on the Shenzhen 
Government’s policies, see Qiao, supra note 5, at 207–12. 
 9. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10. Interview with a worker in Chinatown, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 11, 2014). 
 11. Sarah Wesseler, Inequality and Informality in New York: SITU Studio’s 
Proposal for MoMA’s Uneven Growth Exhibition, ARCH DAILY (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://www.archdaily.com/589157/inequality-and-informality-in-new-york-situ-studio-
s-proposal-for-moma-s-uneven-growth-exhibition [https://perma.cc/6NZK-DSBP]. 
 12. The author had such a personal experience. 
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legally exist.13  The Pratt Center report found that NYC gained 
114,000 apartments not reflected in the official number of certificates 
of occupancy the City granted for new construction or renovation 
between 1990 and 2000.14  Chhaya CDC also conducted a door-to-
door survey in Jackson Heights and the Briarwood/Jamaica section of 
Queens and found that 35% of the total units examined (155 out of 
446 homes) had separate secondary basement units.15  The Citizens 
Housing and Planning Council estimated that nearly 42,000 new 
housing units in Queens, none of which were recorded in the official 
system, amounted to 73% of Queens’ total housing growth from 1990 
to 2000.16 
According to the DOB, “an illegal conversion is an alteration or 
modification of an existing building to create an additional housing 
unit without first obtaining approval.”17  Examples of these illegal 
conversions include creating (without obtaining approval or permits 
from the DOB) an apartment in the basement, attic, or garage of a 
property zoned or designated for manufacturing or industrial use, or 
dividing an apartment into single room occupancies.18  New York 
City has used ineffective law enforcement measures to combat the 
growing prevalence of illegal housing.19  Although scholars and policy 
advocates suggest legalization as a solution to this problem, it remains 
unclear whether legalization is the best course of action either.20  I 
examine both solutions in detail in the following sections. 
A. Legal Enforcement: Too Many to Fail 
The New York City government has strong incentive to take 
measures to enforce the zoning and building codes.  The government 
has warned that illegal housing poses serious safety risks because non-
compliance with Building and Fire Safety Codes creates potentially 
unsafe living conditions.21  In addition, the overcrowding caused by 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. ROBERT NEUWIRTH, NEW YORK’S HOUSING UNDERGROUND: A REFUGE AND 
RESOURCE 2–3 (Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev. & Chhaya Cmt. Dev. Corp., 2008) 
[hereinafter PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT]. 
 14. Id. at 1. 
 15. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 10. 
 16. Martha Galvez & Frank Braconi, New York’s Underground Housing, 9 URB. 
PROSPECT 1, 2 (2013), http://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/UP_
Underground_Housing1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3G4-RRNR]. 
 17. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally infra Section I.A. 
 20. See generally infra Section I.B. 
 21. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3. 
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illegal housing may overburden surrounding essential services, 
reducing a neighborhood’s quality of life, and local businesses may 
suffer from further reduction of already-limited industrial and 
manufacturing space in NYC.22 
It is possible to check the legal uses of a building by viewing the 
building’s Certificate of Occupancy, which can be accessed through 
the DOB website’s Buildings Information System. 23   However, 
current enforcement of zoning and building codes occurs through a 
complaint-based system where neighbors, tenants, and businesses 
offering services to remove the violations may report suspected illegal 
conversions by calling 3-1-1 and anonymously file complaints, 
prompting a Buildings Inspector to inspect the property.24  Property 
owners that are found in violation of zoning and building codes are 
fined by the DOB.25  Because enforcement of building and zoning 
codes substantially relies on neighbor and tenant complaints, the 
system can perpetuate tension and distrust within local 
communities.26  This distrust may be particularly salient because the 
penalties for illegally converting a manufacturing or industrial space 
for residential use can be as high as $24,000 for the first offense.27  
Although NYC collects revenues from these fines, the revenue is 
unlikely to outweigh the costs of inspection, enforcement, housing 
court hearings, and other related costs.28 
New York City has previously had minimal success in its attempts 
to combat its illegal housing.  For example, in March 1997, NYC 
created a unit of thirteen Building Inspectors to ferret out illegal 
conversions in Queens—the borough with the most complaints of 
illegal conversions.29  Between 1996 and 1998 the number of violation 
summonses issued across the city increased more than six-fold, from 
637 to 4,094 respectively.30  But increased vigilance has its own 
complications.  The insufficiency of manpower, the DOB officials’ 
lack of power to enter and vacate illegal buildings, and the absence of 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Vivian S. Toy, Despite City Crackdown, Illegal and Overcrowded Apartments 
Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/nyregion/
despite-city-crackdown-illegal-and-overcrowded-apartments-survive.html?page
wanted=2 [https://perma.cc/M69A-TECU]. 
 30. Id. 
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substitute housing all contributed to making serious enforcement 
difficult. 
First, there is simply inadequate manpower for code enforcement.  
As revealed in the 2014 Queens Borough President Policy Statement: 
Today, less than 300 inspectors are on staff citywide, with no staff 
increase projected.  A majority of complaints become response 
delayed because of the inadequate number of inspectors.  Because 
of these staffing shortfalls, The Department of Buildings and the 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development frequently 
have a backlog of thousands of complaints.  Violations go 
uncorrected, which could lead to building collapse and injuries, and 
millions of dollars in fines go uncollected.  Without robust 
enforcement, there is no deterrent to those involved in the illegal 
conversion of housing or the exploitation of those in need of 
affordable housing.31 
Second, enforcement officials cannot enter an apartment without a 
warrant.  The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects 
housing owners and tenants from unreasonable searches. 32   In 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 33  the Supreme Court held that 
homeowners could refuse to allow housing inspectors access to their 
personal residences until they have obtained a search warrant.34  This 
can apply to homeowners with potential accessory dwelling units in 
NYC.35  The requirement of a warrant makes the verification of 
illegality difficult.  However, when investigations do reveal illegal 
units, the government typically provides landlords with a “grace 
period” to correct violations, unless the housing conditions are 
dangerous or uninhabitable.36  Thus, even when a violation of zoning 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. MELINDA KATZ, THE OFFICE OF THE QUEENS BOROUGH PRESIDENT: 
STRATEGY POLICY STATEMENT 2014 (2014), http://queensbp.org/Queens_Strategic_
Policy_Statement_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3AK-2STF]. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1 (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”); see also Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: 
Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2009). 
 33. 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). 
 34. See George J. Castrataro, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Failure 
in New York City, 14 N.Y. L. F. 60, 63–67 (1968). 
 35. See, e.g., Katie Honan, Half of Illegal Home Subdivision Complaints Are in 
Queens, DNAINFO (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20141028/corona/more-than-half-of-illegal-subdivisions-are-queens-buildings-
dept-says [https://perma.cc/NUV7-LKTB]. 
 36. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3. 
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and building codes is verified, the government can only vacate a 
premises if there is imminent danger. 
The process of going to court over an alleged violation can be very 
expensive. 37   However, if the government cannot evacuate the 
property, residents will continue to stay there.38  On many occasions, 
while the landlords violated the zoning and building codes, tenants 
are forced to stay in the illegal premises.  Some landlords use these 
tenants to their advantage by continuing to collect rent from them to 
help pay government fines.39  Absent owners may ignore summonses 
and become repeat offenders to the DOB.40  Even worse, however, is 
when landlords refer to the illegality of their housing as an excuse to 
evict tenants.41 
Third, regardless of the convenience and effectiveness of the 
procedure to eliminate such illegal housing, the NYC government 
should still be concerned about residents of illegal housing who might 
be otherwise homeless.42  Although the DOB is able to issue vacate 
orders for dangerous dwellings, the Department rarely does so due to 
the lack of relocation options.43  During all of fiscal year of 2002, 
roughly two percent of the 10,000 complaints of illegal conversion to 
the DOB resulted in a vacate order.44  Ed Hernandez, a co-chairman 
of the Long Island Campaign for Affordable Housing, commented on 
this problem in 2003 by stating, “if you crack down on one hand and 
have no alternatives on the other, you’re just making the [housing] 
crisis even more of a crisis.”45 
For all three reasons above, legal enforcement has not worked in 
NYC.  Despite government efforts, the number of illegal units has 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. See, e.g., Tessa Melvin, Legally or Not, 1-Family House Is Often Home To 2 
Families, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/05/
realestate/legally-or-not-1-family-house-is-often-home-to-2-families.html 
[https://perma.cc/2C7R-G29V] (reporting on a 1995 court case that took eleven 
months and cost taxpayers $10,000 in legal fees). 
 38. Toy, supra note 29. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (providing the example of a tenant of an illegal housing unit who said “I 
only get $552 a month in Social Security and my rent is $400, so where else am I going 
to go?”). 
 43. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Vivian S. Toy, Unraveling the Issue of Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (June 
8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/nyregion/unraveling-the-issue-of-illegal-
apartments.html [https://perma.cc/58ML-DNVW]. 
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continued to increase through the decades. 46   Additionally, the 
ineffectiveness of legal enforcement has not significantly improved 
over the years.  In 1997, then-Queens Borough President Claire 
Schulman convened the Queens Illegal Conversion Task Force to 
address the problem of illegal apartment conversions in Queens.47  Of 
the ten houses with illegal apartments closely followed for a year by 
this Illegal Conversion Task Force, all but two of the houses 
continued to have illegal conditions, despite repeated citations and 
fines.48  In at least five cases, the owners neither paid the fines nor 
made changes to the property. 49   According to Patricia Dolan, 
President of the Kew Gardens Hills Homeowners’ Civic Association,  
“[w]e’ve got more inspectors and a lot more violations on the books, 
but there’s still nothing to force compliance and make people correct 
dangerous situations.”50 
B. Legalization: Uncertain Effects 
With the scarcity of affordable housing in NYC, some housing 
advocates are calling for a new approach.  Legalization is the other 
way scholars and policy advocates have proposed to resolve the illegal 
housing problem, and has made it onto the agenda of housing groups. 
51  These advocates argue that legalizing at least some of these 
illegally converted units by waiving certain legal requirements in 
zoning and building codes would have a number of benefits for 
NYC. 52   It would ensure fire safety and health compliance of 
accessory units, reduce the cost of responding to complaints with 
multiple inspections, and enhance ability to accommodate and plan 
for population growth through allocation of resources to area public 
schools, sanitation, parking capacity, and development.  In response 
to these advocates, Mayor Bill de Blasio has singled out illegal 
basements and “granny flats” as possible additions to the city’s rent-
regulated housing stock,53 perhaps drawing on his experience living in 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 47. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 2. 
 48. Toy, supra note 29. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16; CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1; 
PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13. 
 52. Navarro, supra note 4. 
 53. Esmé E. Deprez, Illegal NYC Homes Thrive as De Blasio Tackles Housing, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-
21/illegal-nyc-homes-thrive-as-de-blasio-tackles-housing [https://perma.cc/64V3-
79HF]. 
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a questionably legal basement apartment in Astoria, Queens, in the 
1980s.54  However, it remains unclear how de Blasio is going to 
legalize such illegal housing.  According to the NYC Housing Plan: 
There are thousands of unsanctioned housing units across the city, 
primarily in basements and above garages.  The conditions of these 
units may represent a threat to health and safety of their occupants 
and to the first responders who may be called to respond to 
emergencies in those units.  The engineering and fire safety 
challenges created by these units are extremely complex.  The City 
will work with the relevant stakeholders to examine how best to 
bring these units into the regulated housing system, including a 
review of other cities’ best practices to bring fresh ideas to the 
discussion.55 
The Pratt Center and Chhaya CDC recommend NYC “offer 
landlords who agree to legalize their basement apartments as 
accessory dwelling units a reasonable (e.g., 12–18 month) grace 
period during which they will not be subject to penalties for illegal 
occupancy under the Building Code.” 56   They also recommend 
strengthened enforcement and financial assistance to illegal housing 
landlords and tenants, to encourage compliance.57  It seems to be a 
majority opinion among scholars and policy makers that legalization 
should occur.58  The American Planning Association (APA) has even 
provided a model code for legalization.59  Scholars have examined the 
political opposition to legalization, 60  but the consequences of 
legalization have not been examined in detail and therefore might be 
not as simple of a solution as it seems.  As acknowledged by the APA 
report, owners of Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs) “strongly resist 
legalization out of their fear of higher property taxes, legal sanctions, 
income taxes on rental income, the costs of conforming to local codes, 
                                                                                                                                         
 54. Navarro, supra note 4. 
 55. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-
YEAR PLAN 47 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/
housing_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCX5-YBG5]. 
 56. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. See, e.g., DAN HAFETZ ET AL., BACKGROUND GUIDE ON HOW TO LEGALIZE 
CELLAR APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2009), https://basecampaign.files.
wordpress.com/2013/06/background-guide-on-how-to-legalize-cellar-apartments-in-
new-york-city-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B397-DBQX]. 
 59. See RODNEY L. COBB & SCOTT DVORAK, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: 
MODEL STATE ACT AND LOCAL ORDINANCE (2000), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
consume/d17158_dwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/L87U-VJJ5]. 
 60. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own? 
Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519 (2013). 
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and the possibility that code inspectors will discover a variety of code 
violations.  For these reasons, programs to accommodate illegal 
ADUs have not been very successful.”61 
Many communities in Westchester County, New York, and 
Connecticut have pursued legalization programs as a response to the 
special problems of elderly people owning large homes and the 
increasing number of young people seeking to buy or rent housing.62  
There were also a few legalization programs in towns on Long Island, 
New York, but residents questioned whether any illegal landlord 
would voluntarily submit to paying the required fee and having his or 
her property inspected.63  In Suffolk County, New York, the Town of 
Babylon and its incorporated village of Lindenhurst have amended 
their zoning codes to legalize accessory apartments.64  Although each 
of these suggested legalization programs have implemented a system 
of permits and fees to allow for conversions,65 planning officials in 
these towns and counties have noted that compliance has been slow. 
66  Residents who converted their homes before these codes took 
effect (when it was still illegal) are particularly slow to comply with 
new codes because of the fear that municipalities will require costly 
renovations to their apartments to conform to approved standards, 
and the fear of disapproval from surrounding neighbors.67  In essence, 
legalization programs in the 1980s were predominantly failures.68  For 
example, a legalization program in Old Tappan, New Jersey, was met 
with a disappointingly meager number of applications.69  In the codes 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. COBB & DVORAK, supra note 59, at 49–50. 
 62. Id. (adapting a proposal for ADU legalization from a 1995 draft of the Village 
of Scarsdale, New York’s Zoning Code, §4.7.1.g. of South Winsor, Connecticut’s 1990 
Zoning Ordinance, and §701 m of Hamden, Connecticut’s 1996 Zoning Regulations). 
 63. See Bret Senft, Restricting Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1989 ，)  
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/24/nyregion/restricting-illegal-apartments.html 
[https://perma.cc/XCP4-XW64]. 
 64. Article II: Accessory Apartments in One-Family Dwellings, 1995 Babylon 
Local Law No. 14, Babylon Admin. Legislation §153, art. II., http://ecode360.com/
6808107 [https://perma.cc/CB6S-UHDM] (“It is the purpose of this article to 
encourage the residents of our community who require accessory apartments to 
legally remain in the Town of Babylon.”). 
 65. See supra notes 63 and 64 (and accompanying text). 
 66. Gene Rondinaro, Illegal Accessory Units Trouble Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
3, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/03/realestate/illegal-accessory-units-
trouble-suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/FB8V-QC9H]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. (noting how Old Tappan’s then-mayor commented how the lack of 
applications was “a shame when there is now a perfectly legal method of having it 
done”). 
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written to address the legalization programs, local governments often 
outlined comprehensive procedures to ensure the quality and safety 
of the legalized buildings and to charge the owners a fee for the 
legalization.  Although both requirements are reasonable, many 
illegal housing owners did not like the extra financial burden, and 
therefore would not cooperate.70  What is more, legalization policies 
and laws might be tailored to address the concern of legal housing 
owners in the neighborhood, resulting in stricter compliance 
requirements.  These compliance requirements might further deter 
illegal housing owners from applying for legalization.71 
Although there have been some seemingly successful legalization 
programs, the amount of illegal housing that such programs have 
addressed, and the scale of such programs, are too small to 
adequately assess whether these programs could be successful in New 
York City.  For example, Santa Cruz’s ADU Development Program, 
which has won numerous awards and has been used as a model by 
other communities, averages forty to fifty ADU permits per year.72  
Similarly, Barnstable, Massachusetts’ Accessory Affordable 
Apartment or Amnesty Program, part of their Affordable Housing 
Plan from 2000, has also been highlighted as an exemplary way to 
bring the high number of existing illegal ADUs into compliance with 
current requirements.73  While the program has been successful in 
converting existing illegal accessory apartments into code-compliant 
ADUs, in the eight years after its inception, Barnstable has approved 
only 160 affordable ADUs—roughly twenty ADUs per year.74  Going 
at these rates, it would take more than 2,000 years in Santa Cruz, and 
5,000 years in Barnstable to legalize the 100,000 illegal apartments 
estimated by The Pratt Center and Chhaya CDC.75 
In sum, the NYC government would have more manpower and 
higher capacity to deal with illegal housing if similar programs were 
adopted, but the small numbers in the so-called successful programs 
discussed above do not provide a solid basis to make predictions.  
Instead, the information costs, politics over externality, and 
heterogeneity of the illegal housing sector would be much more 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. See id. 
 71. See Senft, supra note 63. 
 72. See generally U.S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: 
CASE STUDY (2008), http://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/adu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KR8A-WNLW]. 
 73. Id. at 5. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
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significant and complicated in NYC than in these small towns and 
cities where implementation has been moderately successful. 
C. Challenges to Illegal Housing in New York City 
1. Information Costs 
Concealed within the City’s seemingly endless rows of apartment 
buildings, townhouses, and high-rises is a network of typologies that 
have adapted, subdivided, or converted existing spaces to 
accommodate the growing number of individuals who cannot find a 
place to live within the formal housing market.76  With owners 
unwilling to reveal that they have these units for fear of being cited 
with a violation and tenants not daring to report possible unsafe 
conditions for fear of eviction, it is not easy to quantify just how many 
of these underground units exist in New York City and what they 
look like.77  Information cost is an obvious challenge to dealing with 
the illegal housing issue in New York City.  This information cost 
refers not only to gathering information about buildings, but also to 
information about the social relations surrounding housing, including 
renting contracts and property arrangements.  New York courts have 
addressed various issues of illegal housing, such as whether a landlord 
is liable for a tenant’s illegal conversions,78 whether a tenant of an 
illegal apartment is entitled to the government’s relocation 
assistance,79 and whether owners could recover value of use and 
occupancy of premises in illegal conversion.80  These cases testify to 
the complicated property and social arrangements involved in illegal 
housing. A top-down and unified approach to deal with problems of 
illegal housing would require cooperation and information from 
illegal housing owners and tenants. 
2. Externality 
Although city planners might perceive economic and social 
benefits of ADUs, surrounding neighbors often fear the exact 
opposite.  They fear that the increased density and traffic in their 
neighborhoods resulting from the units will cause a decline in their 
                                                                                                                                         
 76. See Wesseler, supra note 11. 
 77. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 78. See Matter of Kurtin v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 473, 911 N.Y.S.2d 40 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 79. See Matter of Smith v. Donovan, 61 A.D.3d 505, 878 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2009). 
 80. See Caldwell v. American Package, 57 A.D.3d 15, 866 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008). 
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property values.81  In fact, neighborhood residents dislike illegal 
housing so much that they voluntarily “police the community” for 
illegal renters in the absence of legal enforcement.82  Residents’ fears 
have some merit, however, as additional housing imposes a 
disproportionate drain on municipal services such as roads, sanitary 
services, and schools.83 
3. Heterogeneity 
The conditions of illegal housing in New York City, as revealed by 
Chhaya CDC, vary case-by-case.  Some illegal housing conditions are 
safe and meet the Building Code, some could easily be made safe and 
habitable, and some are fundamentally inappropriate for habitation—
lacking natural light, proper ventilation, or safe forms of egress—and 
could not be made habitable without major renovations.84  Chhaya 
CDC surveyors found “many tenants living in dangerous and 
extremely overcrowded conditions in units with dilapidated ceilings, 
poor electrical wiring, and tight living quarters with multiple uses that 
seemed unsafe for habitation.”85  Naturally, these units in serious 
violation of building safety codes would require significantly more 
work to become compliant with the law. 
Residents of illegal housing also vary.  There are tenants who live 
in accessory housing temporarily, but also tenants have been living in 
accessory units for many years.86  Families who have been living in 
ADUs for several years are considered an integral part of the local 
community.87  Their children are enrolled in local schools, they 
worship in local faith institutions, have family or established 
                                                                                                                                         
 81. See Frank Bruni & Deborah Sontag, Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A 
Teeming, Angry Urban Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/nyregion/behind-a-suburban-facade-in-queens-a-
teeming-angry-urban-arithmetic.html [https://perma.cc/N2J6-JY6G] (quoting a 
community resident who stated: “The house that used to send two kids to school 
sends eight . . . .  This has created havoc with the quality of life in our community.”); 
Morris Newman, Focus: Riverside, Calif.; The Welcome Mat’s Out for ‘Granny 
Flats’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/
08/25/realestate/focus-riverside-calif-the-welcome-mat-s-out-for-granny-flats.html 
[https://perma.cc/5PHN-JP85]. 
 82. See Marcelle S. Fischler, Fighting In-Home Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/realestate/14lizo.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&ad
xnnlx=1428895208fJGAPZc9XzdYAjsfJwethg [https://perma.cc/FNY5-HVZT]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 4. 
 85. Id. at 9 (noting one instance of an individual spending twelve years in his 
friend’s home). 
 86. Toy, supra note 45. 
 87. See id. 
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friendships with residents in the community, and are, in many cases, 
happy with their communities.88  Social classes of illegal housing 
tenants also vary, where some tenants of ADUs are unauthorized 
immigrants, unemployed, and/or on welfare, and some are also 
teachers, nurses or workers at hospitals. 89 
There are therefore also differences in the interests and 
preferences of illegal housing owners.  Some owners want to get legal 
title for these units; some simply may not care.90  The Chhaya CDC 
calls for further research that would help facilitate the integration of 
illegal housing into the law, “including the projected cost of 
conversion for [the] average unit, a comparative assessment of 
increase[s] in tax liabilities, costs of conversion versus income 
generated, and impact on long-term property value”; 91  and, 
additionally, a “comparative analysis of time and resources for an 
owner to proactively legalize versus responding to a complaint of 
illegal use.”92  Such costs would vary by circumstance, and it would be 
difficult to give a unified answer for city-wide illegal housing.  This 
variance explains why some people say they would be the first to 
apply for legalization if there is such a program but, on the other hand, 
many existing programs have had very limited success. 93 
II.  LESSONS FROM SHENZHEN 
Shenzhen is a city similar in size to New York City.  However, it 
faces an even bigger problem of illegal housing because almost half of 
the housing in Shenzhen is built in violation of zoning and building 
codes, and therefore illegal.94  In the past three decades the Shenzhen 
city government has implemented various measures to deal with 
illegal housing while facing the same challenges arising from 
information costs, externality, and heterogeneity as in New York 
City. 95   As such, New York City can learn from Shenzhen’s 
experiences dealing with illegal housing.  In this Part, I apply Ian 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See supra Section I.B. 
 91. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Cf. Elissa Gootman, What Lies Behind Door No. 2? In This Town, Don’t 
Even Ask, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/nyregion/
what-lies-behind-door-no-2-in-this-town-don-t-even-ask.html [https://perma.cc/484X-
6C8R]. 
 94. Qiao, supra note 5, at 210. 
 95. See infra Section II.C. 
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Ayre’s optional law framework,96 which is an expansion of Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s structure of legal entitlements97 
to analyze illegal housing and adverse zoning, i.e., private 
construction and land use against governmental zoning and building 
codes.  This new “optional zoning” approach can be applied to 
analyze the practices of Shenzhen for the past three decades, which 
adopted five of the six rules under the optional zoning framework in 
dealing with illegal housing. The most cost-effective solution is to 
grant call options, rather than titles to illegal housing owners. 
A. Comparability 
Table 1. Comparison of New York City and Shenzhen 
 Population Land 
Population in 
Illegal 
Housing 
New York 
City 
8,491,07998 
783.8 square 
km99
300,000 to 
500,000100 
Shenzhen 10,628,900
101
 
1996.8 square 
km102
Up to 8 
million103 
Situated immediately north of Hong Kong, in the southern part of 
China’s Guangdong Province, Shenzhen has been considered the 
symbolic heart of the Chinese economic reform.104  In 1980, Deng 
Xiaoping, the then supreme leader of China, designated Shenzhen 
(then an agriculture county of about 300,000 farmers named Bao’An) 
as a “special economic zone” (SEZ) to pilot market-oriented 
reforms. 105   Since the establishment of the SEZ, Shenzhen has 
boomed into economic growth and urbanization.  From 1979 to 2010, 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL 
ENTITLEMENTS 1–4 (2005). 
 97. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 98. See Department of City Planning of New York, Census Bureau Estimates for 
July 1, 2014, Population: Current Population Estimates, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml [https://perma.cc/N58V-9UDJ]. 
 99. See State & County QuickFacts: New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html [https://perma.cc/TZ66-
CLBT]. 
 100. See PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 101. STATISTICS BUREAU OF SHENZHEN CITY & SHENZHEN SURVEY OFFICE OF 
THE STATE STATISTICS BUREAU, SHENZHEN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2014, § 1.1.2 
(2014), http://www.sztj.gov.cn/nj2014/indexce.htm [https://perma.cc/5G9Z-EC3S]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Qiao, supra note 5, at 197, 201. 
 104. Id. at 207. 
 105. Id. 
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the annual average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in Shenzhen was 25.3%.106  Shenzhen ranked fourth in GDP and first 
in GDP per capita among mainland Chinese cities in 2009.107  The 
population of Shenzhen has grown from 314,100 in 1979, of whom 
312,600 had local hukou (household registration), to 10,372,000 in 
2010, of whom only 2,510,300 had local hukou.108 
The exponential population growth also brought huge demand for 
housing, but there was no housing crisis like in New York City.109  In 
Shenzhen, housing prices are significantly more expensive than can be 
afforded by the majority of the population.110  Most of the eight 
million migrant workers in Shenzhen actually stay in illegal housing, 
which composes 47.57% of the total floor space of Shenzhen.111  Such 
housing is illegal because it violates land use regulations and building 
codes.  Illegal land development has played an indispensable role in 
the rapid economic growth of Shenzhen.112 
B. Optional Zoning 
Zoning is the right of the government to control land and building 
use.  Adverse possession is when an individual possesses property 
owned by someone else without his or her permission until the statute 
of limitations expires for the owner to recover possession, which 
allows the adverse possessor to acquire a root of title to that already-
owned property.113  American law often requires that possession must 
be exclusive, open and notorious, actual, continuous, and adverse 
                                                                                                                                         
 106. SHENZHEN STATISTICS BUREAU & NBS SURVEY OFFICE IN SHENZHEN, 
SHENZHEN STATISTICAL 5 (2011). 
 107. ZHENG LE, THE PATH OF SHENZHEN 16 (2010). 
 108. See SHENZHEN STATISTICS BUREAU & NBS SURVEY OFFICE IN SHENZHEN, 
supra note 106, at 4. 
 109. See generally Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate 
Market without Legal Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 253, 258–59 (2014). 
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anything else. See Cankaoxiaoxi (参考消息 ), Gangmei:  Hushen Mingzhong 
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2015), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/zs/2015-09-17/doc-ifxhytwr2121287.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/45VM-WSE6]. 
 111. See Qiao, supra note 5. 
 112. See generally Qiao, supra note 109, at 270–71. 
 113. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO 
U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 34 (2010). 
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under a claim of right.114  Illegal land use can, therefore, be called 
“adverse zoning” by land users by applying the adverse possession 
concept to government-held property interests.115  We can explore 
how to structure the legal entitlements between illegal land users and 
the government under the framework of adverse possession.116 
The concept of adverse possession can be extended beyond the 
possession of things.  For example, the revival of recent research on 
adverse possession was partly attributed to a California Supreme 
Court decision about prescriptive easement.117  Related to adverse 
possession, prescription is “the effect of lapse of time in creating or 
extinguishing property interests.”118  It is based on the theory that if 
“one makes non-permissive use of another’s land, and the landowner 
fails to prevent such use, such acquiescence is conclusive evidence 
that the user is rightful”.119  A prescriptive easement is created “by 
such use of land, for the period of prescription, as would be privileged 
if an easement existed, provided its use is (1) adverse, and (2) for the 
period of prescription, continuous and uninterrupted.”120 
Thomas Merrill calls prescriptive easement a first cousin of adverse 
possession. 121   Prescriptive easement and adverse possession are 
different in that the former involves non-possessory use of property, 
which ripens into an easement, and the latter involves possession of 
property, which ripens into a fee simple. 122   Though the non-
possessory nature of an easement generally means that the continuity 
and exclusivity elements should be interpreted differently than in a 
case of adverse possession, the same legal requirements apply to both 
adverse possession and prescriptive easements.  Scholars often do not 
distinguish too sharply between the rules of legal entitlements under 
adverse possession and prescriptive easement.123  Because adverse 
                                                                                                                                         
 114. Id. at 35. 
 115. Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver & 
Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U. 
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86 (1996). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 86–87. 
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possession plays a more significant role in property law, discussions of 
“the effect of lapse of time in creating or extinguishing property 
interests” are more often under the framework of adverse possession. 
As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed wrote, the first issue 
that any legal system must face is the problem of “entitlement.”124  
When presented with conflicting interests of two or more individuals 
or groups of individuals, a state must decide which side to favor and 
the kind of protection to grant to that side.125  Calabresi and Melamed 
define three types of entitlements—entitlements protected by 
property rules, entitlements protected by liability rules, and 
inalienable entitlements.126  Property rules protect entitlements by 
deterring nonconsensual takings. 127   As such, an entitlement is 
protected by a property rule when an individual who wants to take an 
entitlement from another must buy it from a voluntary seller at an 
agreed upon price.128  Liability rules, on the other hand, protect 
entitlements by compensating the entitlement holder when such 
takings in fact occur.129  Therefore, an entitlement is protected by a 
liability rule when an individual who wants to take an entitlement 
from another can destroy the initial entitlement if the individual is 
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it. 
Merrill first applied the Calabresi-Melamed framework to analyze 
adverse possession.130  Adopting this approach to analyzing adverse 
zoning, the state can choose among four different rules. 
 
Table 2: Calabresi and Melamed’s Two-by-Two Box Applied to 
Adverse Zoning131 
 Method of Protection
Initial Entitlement Property Rule Liability Rule 
The Government Rule 1 Rule 2 
Adverse Zoners Rule 3 Rule 4 
 Rule 1:  Government prohibits adverse zoning—the 
government’s zoning cannot be violated. 
 Rule 2:  Government has the zoning power, but individuals can 
violate it by paying compensation. 
                                                                                                                                         
 124. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1090–92. 
 125. Id. at 1092. 
 126. Id. 
 127. AYRES, supra note 96, at 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Merrill, supra note 117. 
 131. For a similar table, see AYRES, supra note 96, at 14. 
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 Rule 3:  Government recognizes adverse zoning without 
requirements of compensation. 
 Rule 4:  Government recognizes adverse zoning, but can get rid 
of it by compensating individuals. 
 
The Calabresi and Melamed categorization has since dominated 
the discussions of legal entitlements—scholars have discussed 
different aspects of these rules, tried to expand their content, and 
even invented new rules. 132   Among many others, Ian Ayres 
significantly expanded the content of liability rules by introducing 
option theory into this field.133  To define an option, it must be 
determined who has the option, whether the option is to buy (a “call 
option”) or to sell (a “put option”), and the price of exercising the 
option.134  The individual who has the call option can force a sale at 
this exercise price, even if the seller does not want to sell. 135  
According to Ayres, traditional liability rules that give at least one 
party an option to take an entitlement non-consensually and pay the 
entitlement owner some exercise price gives potential takers a call 
option.  With this new conception of traditional liability rules as 
granting a potential taker a call option, academics began 
conceptualizing put options in this context.  Here, put options would 
give the option holder the choice of whether to be paid a non-
negotiated amount, giving rise to “forced purchases.” 
Applied to adverse zoning, the possibility of put options suggests 
two additional rules: 
 
 Rule 5: Government grants titles to adverse zoners, but also 
gives them the option of waiving their titles in return for 
compensation from the government. 
 Rule 6: Government not only can keep its entitlement to 
zoning, but also has the option to give up its entitlement and 
receive compensation from adverse zoners. 
                                                                                                                                         
 132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex 
Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
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Incorporating the possibility of “put-option” rules, the structure of 
legal entitlements in adverse zoning is as following: 
 
Table 3: Ayres’ Two-by-Three Box Applied to Adverse Zoning136 
 Method of Protection 
Initial 
Entitlement 
Property Rule Liability Rule 
Call Option
Liability Rule 
Put Option 
The 
Government 
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 6 
Adverse 
Zoners 
Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 
According to the distribution of assets and options, the structure of 
legal entitlements in adverse zoning can be depicted as follows: 
 
Table 4: Ayres’ Table of Claims137 Applied to Adverse Zoning 
 Govt’s Claim AZ’s Claim 
Rule 1 Zoning  0 
Rule 2 Zoning - Call Option Call Option 
Rule 3 0 Adverse Zoning 
Rule 4 Call Option Adverse Zoning - 
Call Option 
Rule 5 - Put Option Adverse Zoning + 
Put Option 
Rule 6 Zoning + Put Option - Put Option 
C. Practices in Shenzhen 
In Shenzhen, each village has a shareholding co-op at the core their 
community.  These co-ops are responsible for managing the collective 
development land and issue dividends to villagers at the end of each 
year.138  The income generated by the land funds a variety of public 
works.  Members of village co-op boards are typically well-known 
figures in the community, creating a sense of familiarity and giving 
the co-ops intimate knowledge of local property arrangements, 
knowledge that external government branches would otherwise be 
unable to access.139  In addition to their superior access, co-ops 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. For a similar table, see id. 
 137. See id. at 17. 
 138. Qiao, supra note 109, at 260. 
 139. Id. 
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benefit from fewer formal constraints than other government 
entities.140 
Village co-ops are willing to provide information and support for 
illegal housing transactions because of economic incentives.  They 
keep records of village building histories in the form of property 
maps, meeting minutes, or sales receipts, and determine property 
rights in illegal buildings.141  It is the village co-ops that decide and 
coordinate how much to build in the villages, and represent villagers 
in negotiating with the government on rezoning.142 
As early as in 1982, the Shenzhen government tried to make a 
feasible plan to deal with the illegal rural houses.143  In dealing with 
the village co-ops, the Shenzhen government has tried five of the six 
rules under optional zoning framework in the past decades.144  The 
only missing rule in the Shenzhen government policies, Rule 5, is 
actually applicable to a certain group of cases.  Shenzhen 
demonstrates that neither Rule 1 nor Rule 3 works in dealing with 
adverse zoning—to demolish illegal housing is too costly to achieve 
and granting illegal housing legal titles for free encourages more 
illegal land use.145  Instead, it is more cost-effective and feasible to 
grant the government the initial entitlement to zoning, rather than 
individual land users, and therefore Rule 2 (granting call options to 
illegal housing owners) is the most efficient policy.146  In the following 
section, I present a detailed analysis of the six rules in Shenzhen.  
1. Neither Legal Enforcement nor Legalization Works: The 
Limitation of Rule 1, Rule 3, and Rule 6  
Legal enforcement, i.e., Rule 1, has proved to be too costly for the 
government.  From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Shenzhen 
government promulgated a series of regulations to deal with illegal 
land use.147  However, in the face of prevalent illegal land use, the 
government’s enforcement power seemed limited.  A typical illegal 
building demolition involves dozens of government employees, 
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 141. Id. at 261. 
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 145. See infra Section II.C.2. 
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including construction workers who are responsible for demolition 
and policemen who maintain order during the demolition.148  Each 
demolition is a battle between the government and villagers, which 
frequently results in bloody conflicts.149  Despite the time and energy 
put into each demolition, the number of illegal buildings continued to 
increase over time.150  From 1999 to 2010, the number of illegal 
buildings grew from 221,600 to 348,400.151  The huge expense of 
demolition has become unaffordable for the government.  In March 
of 2013, the local People’s Congress published a draft of “Regulation 
of Land Use Monitoring,” which required the owners of illegal 
buildings to pay the demolition fees.  In order to do that, the 
Department of Land Use Monitoring could take the owners’ 
properties, such as automobiles, legal real estate, and bank savings, as 
lien.152 
Although the Shenzhen government may have circumvented the 
costs of demolition, the larger issue is that illegal housing is too 
interconnected with the normal functioning of the city to fail.  These 
buildings essentially provide affordable shelter to the middle-and-low 
income population, such as taxi drivers, factory workers, and even 
young white-collar workers, and sometime even space for small high-
tech start-ups.153  Rents of such illegal buildings are also the main 
income of over 300,000 indigenous villagers, whose interests cannot 
be easily disregarded.154 
After legal enforcement proved to be ineffective, the Shenzhen city 
government also tried legalization.  Its free-titling policy, which is 
essentially Rule 3, has been mainly limited to a “one household, one 
house” policy.155  This legalization policy also failed.  In addition to 
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effectively encouraging illegal land use, the Shenzhen government 
gained very little revenue from this policy and was embarrassed that 
its policy benefited law-violators rather than law-abiders.156 
First, villagers had to devote substantial resources to obtain a 
permit to build a house, regardless of whether they had already built 
one or not.157  Getting a permit sometimes depended on how a 
“household” is defined.  One house could be divided into two 
households just to get the benefits from the “one household, one 
house” policy.158  Many resources were spent on lobbying and bribing 
government officials with authority to issue such permits.159  Second, 
many people viewed this and other policies which provide 
mechanisms for villagers to legalize their illegal real estate as a signal 
that the government was unable to enforce harsh demolition rules 
and would have to grant legal titles to all illegal buildings.160  Villagers 
responded with more illegal land use to secure their claims of rights in 
the possible situation of free-titling-for-all.161  This desire to secure 
property in case of free titling was the main reason that each time the 
Shenzhen government initiated a campaign to deal with illegal 
buildings, there was a burst of illegal land use.162 
The Shenzhen government also promulgated a local regulation 
allowing villagers to keep their illegal houses after paying fines and 
land-use fees—essentially Rule 6 under the optional zoning 
framework.  The comprehensive plan included standards of fines and 
fees that were again set according to owners’ identities and the total 
areas of the buildings, and the plan provided that legal title for each 
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illegal building would have a price after calculation.163  Owners of 
illegal buildings were required to apply for legal titles from the 
government within one year of the decree’s promulgation, giving the 
Shenzhen government information on illegal buildings within its 
jurisdiction.164  This did not work out well.  The regulation was made 
in 2001, and it took the Shenzhen government nine years to gather its 
first detailed report on illegal buildings, only to conclude that, despite 
substantial efforts, the regulation had not been well received by illegal 
housing owners.  Although there were other owners of illegal 
buildings who applied for legalization, by 2010, only about one 
quarter of the 221,600 illegal buildings built before 1999 were granted 
legal titles, and the total number of illegal buildings had increased to 
348,400.165 
The information costs required to enforce the put-option liability 
rule are too high for the government to enforce.  The government 
would need to impossibly accumulate all the information on all illegal 
buildings within its jurisdiction.  While physical information regarding 
the location, height and floor areas are not difficult to collect, the 
collection of information regarding the history, quality, and other less 
tangible characters of the illegal buildings are very costly.166  Even 
more costly than these intangible factors is collecting information 
regarding the social and economic relations of the illegal buildings 
(e.g., who owns them, and who should get legal title). 
The most costly information gathering, however, is determining 
how much an owner values their property.  The cost of strategic 
bargaining could be prohibitively high, particularly when the 
government exercised its put option and thus had no opportunity to 
know the owner’s evaluation.  For owners of illegal buildings, the 
complicated titling procedures imposed high information costs on 
them and fostered distrust of the government, both of which might 
prevent owners from even thinking about whether the fees and fines 
charged by the government are reasonable.167 
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In summary, there might be a price that both the government and 
adverse zoners would accept for legalization of the illegal buildings, 
but the government’s put option is too costly to exercise it.  To make 
sure that the price was set right, the government had to design 
complicated rules, which in turn caused great information costs to 
villagers. 
2. Too Expensive for the Government to Buy: The Limitation of 
Rule 4 and Rule 5 
Under Rule 4, the government can grant legal titles to owners of 
illegally developed buildings, but retains the option to take these 
buildings provided it compensates the owners. The Shenzhen 
government has tried this approach in fulfilling its obligation to 
provide affordable housing.  Although the Chinese central 
government has required local governments to build low-income 
public housing, the Shenzhen government did not have enough land 
to comply.168  The Shenzhen government found that, rather than 
developing extra houses, requisitioning small-property houses might 
more appropriate for their city where most low-income people lived 
in illegal housing.169  Under this plan, setting a proper price is also a 
key issue.  Social conflicts would arise if the government insisted on 
requisitioning the illegal houses with too little compensation.  The 
costs of information and bargaining to set the proper price could be 
high.  On the other hand, the Shenzhen government could not afford 
to purchase over 400 million square meters of illegal buildings at a 
reasonable price.170  Regardless, the goal of “requisitioning illegal 
buildings for public housing” is questionable.  If illegal housing was 
adequate public housing and indeed served as homes to low-income 
population through the small-property market, why should the 
government become the owner? 
Under Rule 5, adverse zoners would not only have the legal title, 
but would also have an option to waive their titles in return for 
government compensation.  The Shenzhen government has not 
adopted such a rule in dealing with illegal land use in its history.171 
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3. Optional Zoning That Works: Rule 2  
Of the six adverse zoning rules, the most successful and promising 
solution has been Rule 2, wherein the government keeps its 
entitlement to zoning, but adverse zoners can take it by paying 
compensation.172  The use of this rule emerged over time through 
Shenzhen’s various village redevelopment projects.173  In the process 
of redeveloping villages where illegal land development was prevalent, 
the Shenzhen government insisted that only legally-developed land 
could be redeveloped and only legally-built houses could be 
compensated.174  However, it was clear to the government and other 
individuals that village redevelopment, regardless of whether it was 
on legally-developed land, would bring big profits through 
modernization. 175  Because of this realization, the government began 
to ignore whether redeveloped buildings were legal or illegal as long 
as the project can supply 20% of its land to the government for free 
and develop another 12% of land for public roads and other public 
facilities.176 
While the government has the entitlement to regulating and 
limiting development on the land, Rule 2 provides an option for the 
villagers to pay the fixed price (i.e., 32% of its land) to the 
government for legal rights to develop the remaining land.177  In this 
scenario, the government does not need to do much—because the 
villagers know the value of their land best, the government should not 
have to waste resources to find this information.  Compared with the 
reluctance received by other legalization plans, villagers have actively 
applied for village redevelopment, resulting in 342 projects between 
2009 and 2012 involving 30 square kilometers of illegally-developed 
land, and in 2011 alone such projects contributed almost 40% of 
newly-developed residential housing in 2011.178 
This rule differs from the government’s put-option liability rule in 
several key aspects.  First, this approach places the decision-making 
power with villagers, who are both more attuned to opportunities in 
the market, as well as more aware of the real estate under their 
control.179  Second, titling becomes a continuous process under this 
                                                                                                                                         
 172. Id. at 311. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 311–12. 
2016] DEALING WITH ILLEGAL HOUSING 739 
rule, allowing villagers to decide whether to exercise their call option 
based on real market opportunities, rather than on theoretical 
predictions.180  This flexibility in timing can even counteract the 
negative effects of the government’s potential bad pricing that 
villagers would be subject to where the government exercises its put 
option.  Instead, Rule 2 allows the villagers to exercise their options 
anytime based on market opportunities, prices of real estate, and do 
not have to rely on the price of exercising the call option at a certain 
point in time.181  While the government could also choose the timing 
of exercising its put option, it is more difficult to choose the right time 
without knowing the villagers’ information.  Thus, Rule 2 leaves the 
decision to the party with better information.182 
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY-BASED ZONING OPTIONS 
How should cities allocate legal entitlements efficiently?  Ayres’ 
optional law theory tells us that “[l]iability rules delegate allocational 
authority—allocational options—to privately informed disputants.  
The delegation effect gives us strong reasons to believe that liability 
rules do a better job than property rules in harnessing the private 
information of disputants.”183  Applying this theory to address illegal 
housing in NYC, I argue that the government should grant illegal 
housing owners options to buy legal titles rather than providing 
blanket, direct legalization. 
While the government knows its own needs and valuation of the 
right to zone, individual owners have the information about their 
illegal housing.  The government has two roles in this case—one as a 
disputant and potential entitlement holder, and the other as a 
policymaker who can determine who has to decide the final allocation 
of entitlements.  The government as policymaker in this case has 
complete information about one disputant—the government—but 
does not have enough information about numerous illegal dwelling 
units and their occupants’ valuations of them, which are more diverse 
and speculative than the government’s valuations. 
New York City can learn several things from Shenzhen.  First, 
decisions about illegal housing should be made at the community 
level because externality is primarily a community-level issue, and 
local communities are better at monitoring individual land uses than 
the city government.  Second, neither legal enforcement nor 
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traditional legalization is going to effectively solve the problem of 
illegal housing.  Private land users have an informational advantage 
and greater control over their land compared to the government, 
which makes effective legal enforcement against prevalent zoning 
violations almost impossible.  “Traditional legalization” here can be 
categorized into two rules—legalization without any charges on illegal 
housing owners (i.e., Rule 3) and imposed legalization with charges 
on illegal housing owners (i.e., Rule 6), which is the forced sale of the 
legal title by the government to the adverse zoners.  Application of 
Rule 3 jeopardizes the integrity of zoning, ignores the negative 
externality that adverse zoning imposes on the community and the 
city, and encourages adverse zoning without effective checking on 
private land use.  Application of Rule 6 faces the challenges brought 
by heterogeneity, such as making it impossible to set a price that 
would work for all adverse zoners.  The government should have the 
initial entitlement to zoning generally but can create zoning options 
for illegal housing owners.  It would be financially burdensome for 
the government to pay individual land users for zoning.  Instead, 
adverse zoning should only be applicable in limited cases and should 
be auctioned at the community level.184  Members who exercise these 
options need to pay the community for the extra burden caused by 
crowding, traffic, garbage collection, etc. 
Essentially, the government should determine who decides, rather 
than deciding the final allocation of resources.  Options, instead of 
titles, should be granted to individual adverse zoners, as individual 
zoners are more numerous and capable of multiple takings than 
collective decision-makers.  These zoners also have private 
information and the more speculative valuation of the land, both of 
which are less known to the government and the community. 
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